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I. INTRODUCTION 
 It is hard not to sympathize with the thrust of Michael A. 
Newton’s impressive article “How the International Criminal Court 
Threatens Treaty Norms.” A friend of the ICC keen to see it thrive, 
Newton offers some home truths with a view to correcting what he 
suggests is a damaging tendency towards jurisdictional overreach on 
the part of the Office of the Prosecutor (OTP) and, through the OTP, 
the Court. Many readers may find themselves nodding along to the 
gist of the argument, which puts its finger on something in claiming 
that the Court is insufficiently sensitive to the finely wrought 
framework of jurisdictional allocation reflected in the Rome Statute. 
Sure, one may wonder whether the blame lies solely or even chiefly 
on the OTP. The Al Bashir debacle,1 for one, is at least as much the 
fault of the Pre-Trial Chambers and Registrar as of the Prosecutor, 
although it is true that this tussle involves the Court’s competence to 
proceed with a request for surrender, rather than to entertain 
proceedings; and when it comes to Newton’s examples of the 
situations in Afghanistan and Palestine, the Prosecutor is yet to 
proceed beyond preliminary examination. One may equally wish to 
reflect on some of the article’s more detailed reasoning. But there is 
evident sense in Newton’s call for prosecutorial respect for the terms 
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of States Parties’ conferral of power on the Court, in particular as it 
relates to their other treaty arrangements. 
 Where the reader may differ from the approach taken in the 
article, even if not necessarily with its practical upshot in specific 
circumstances, is in its analysis of the jurisdiction conferred by States 
Parties on the Court in respect of their territory. The maxim nemo 
plus iuris transferre potest quam ipse habet emphasized by Newton 
cannot be gainsaid. The question, however, is less quantum iuris, or 
how much right a state possesses and passes on, than quid ius or 
quia iura, or which right or rights. Jurisdiction is not a solid block of 
“right.” It is a subtle layering of different rights, whose existence, 
moreover, must be distinguished from their exercise. While a state 
may undertake by treaty to refrain from exercising one or more of 
these rights, it still retains them and is competent to confer them in 
their plenitude on the ICC. True, the state will be obliged to the 
extent of its other treaty undertaking to refrain from the exercise of 
these rights through the medium of the Court. But Article 98 of the 
Rome Statute provides a purpose-built mechanism to prevent the 
Court from obliging a State Party to act in breach of a treaty 
undertaking not to exercise one or more of its jurisdictional rights. In 
short, the Court may not ride roughshod over a variety of other 
treaty-based jurisdictional arrangements agreed by States Parties. 
The Court remains competent, however, to entertain proceedings in 
such cases, whatever this may mean for breach by the state of its 
other treaties. 
II. THE ROME STATUTE’S DELICATE BALANCE 
 Mike Newton’s article performs a considerable service in 
reminding the reader of some incontrovertible tenets of the law of 
international organizations (loosely so called in the case of an organ 
like the ICC) and of the law of treaties. First, the ICC is competent to 
exercise only that power vested in it by the States Parties to its 
Statute. In turn, the States Parties are not competent to transfer to 
the Court a power that they do not possess. Nemo plus iuris 
transferre potest quam ipse habet, as Cicero may or may not have put 
it. Secondly, a treaty may not lawfully diminish the international 
legal rights of states not party to it2—that is, of what the law of 
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treaties refers to as “third states.”3 States Parties to an agreement 
that infringes the rights under international law of a third state 
commit an internationally wrongful act against that state. Thirdly, 
while specific treaty provisions, the customary international rules of 
treaty interpretation, and canons of treaty application such as the lex 
specialis and lex posterior maxims may go some way to avoiding 
conflict between a state’s multiple treaty obligations, customary 
international law contains no legal means of deciding which of two 
unavoidably conflicting treaty obligations is to take priority. A state 
that becomes party to more than one treaty on the same subject may 
render itself the servant of two unrelenting masters. 
 More to the point, Newton is probably right to suggest that the 
OTP has shown less care than advisable towards the delicate balance 
struck in the Rome Statute between States Parties’ obligations in 
relation to the ICC and their jurisdictional obligations to third states. 
The incaution, however, has arguably related more to the Court’s 
competence to proceed with requests for surrender than to its 
competence to exercise jurisdiction over given persons and to states’ 
customary obligations under the law of jurisdictional immunities 
than to their jurisdictional arrangements under treaties. But be that 
as it may. There is, one cannot help feel, a large grain of truth in 
Newton’s argument that the Prosecutor would do well to be more 
solicitous of the terms of the delegation by States Parties of power on 
the Court. 
III. A STATE’S “JURISDICTION” AND THE DELEGATION OF ITS EXERCISE 
TO THE COURT 
 Where one might beg to differ with Newton is in his analysis of 
the jurisdiction in respect of their territory conferred by States 
Parties on the Court. There is no doubting the maxim nemo plus iuris 
transferre potest quam ipse habet. The question is how it applies in 
the present context. In the final analysis, the situation is both more 
complicated and more straightforward than Newton’s reasoning 
suggests. 
 The key to understanding here lies in the protean concept of 
state “jurisdiction.” In Newton’s article we find repeated reference to 
the “quantum” of jurisdiction enjoyed by states over their territory 
and therefore capable of being conferred by them on the Court. But 
jurisdiction is not a quantity. It is a complex—a complex of rights, 
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 3.  A “third state” is standard terminology in the law of treaties for a state not 
party to a given treaty. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 2(1)(h), 1155 
U.N.T.S. 331, 1969, 8 I.L.M. (entered into force Jan. 27, 1980) [hereinafter VCLT] 
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and of rights the existence of which is not to be confused with their 
exercise. A state’s “jurisdiction” in respect of its territory and its 
conferral of the same on the Court can be accurately analyzed only by 
appreciating certain crucial distinctions.4 
 It is first necessary to distinguish among the three distinct rights 
encompassed by the term “jurisdiction,” clarity with regard to which 
is perennially confounded by the fact that each is referred to in its 
own right as “jurisdiction.” These three distinct rights are 
traditionally labelled jurisdiction to prescribe, jurisdiction to 
adjudicate and jurisdiction to enforce.5 Jurisdiction to prescribe refers 
to a state’s right under international law to assert the applicability of 
its law to given circumstances, whether by means of primary or 
subordinate legislation, executive decree, or judicial action.6 In the 
criminal context, jurisdiction to prescribe can be described simply as 
a state’s right under international law to criminalize given conduct.7 
Jurisdiction to adjudicate refers to a state’s right under international 
law to entertain legal proceedings in respect of given circumstances, 
which in the criminal context means given conduct.8 In the criminal 
context, jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate go 
hand in hand.9 Jurisdiction to enforce refers to a state’s right under 
international law to deploy investigative, coercive or custodial 
powers, whether through police or other executive action or through 
its courts. 10  The point here is that reference in an international 
                                                                                                                       
 4.  It is also necessary to appreciate that the international lawfulness of one 
state’s jurisdiction is without prejudice to the international lawfulness of another’s. 
Jurisdiction may be concurrent. In the case of jurisdiction to prescribe and to 
adjudicate, the fact that another state has the right under customary international law 
to criminalize and adjudge the conduct, wherever committed, of its nationals and 
foreign members of its armed forces in no way diminishes the right of the state where 
the conduct is committed to criminalize and adjudge conduct committed by whomever 
in its territory. That said, jurisdiction may equally be exclusive. It depends on the 
terms of any specific agreement or customary international rule in play. 
 5.  See O’KEEFE, supra note 1, at 4–6. 
 6.  Id. at 4. 
 7.  Id. at 5. 
 8.  Id. at 4. 
 9.  Indeed, separate reference to jurisdiction to adjudicate is generally 
unnecessary in the criminal context, where the universal practice is that municipal 
courts will not apply foreign law. In other words, in the criminal-law context, it can be 
assumed that a municipal court is applying the law of the forum state, and the 
application of a state’s law by its courts is simply the exercise or actualization of 
prescription, amounting as it does to an assertion that the law in question is applicable 
to the relevant person. See id. at 5. That said, there is no harm in referring to a state’s 
jurisdiction to adjudicate upon criminal matters, and there are instances in which 
distinguishing between jurisdiction to prescribe and jurisdiction to adjudicate in the 
criminal context can have explanatory value. 
 10.  Id. at 4–5. In the criminal context, jurisdiction to enforce can be described 
in concrete terms as a state’s right under international law to arrest and retain custody 
over persons and vessels, to have a court sit, to incarcerate persons and confiscate 
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agreement to a state’s “jurisdiction” is not necessarily and not usually 
to all three distinct rights—or, putting it another way, to all three 
distinct “jurisdictions”—potentially encompassed by the term. It may 
be and usually is to only one or two of them. 
 It is just as necessary, when considering a state’s “jurisdiction,” 
to distinguish between the existence of jurisdiction and its exercise. 
The fact that a given exercise of jurisdiction by a state would be 
contrary to its international obligations is without prejudice to the 
internationally lawful possession of the underlying jurisdiction to be 
exercised. In the case of jurisdiction to adjudicate, a state’s treaty 
undertaking or customary obligation to refrain from prosecuting a 
given category of persons in no way diminishes its right under 
customary international law to entertain criminal proceedings in 
respect of conduct committed in its territory. A state’s right under 
customary international law to entertain criminal proceedings in 
respect of conduct committed in its territory is without regard to the 
identity of the author of the conduct, to the nature of the conduct, and 
so on. It is plenary, and it remains so even where the state 
undertakes not to exercise it in given circumstances. The present 
relevance of the distinction between the existence of jurisdiction and 
its exercise is that reference in an international agreement to 
“jurisdiction” may be to that jurisdiction’s existence or to its exercise. 
 These two distinctions are critical when considering the legal 
effect of treaty provisions, such as those found in status of forces 
agreements (SOFAs) and the like, which provide that given personnel 
“are subject to the exclusive jurisdiction”11 of the sending state, as 
well as of treaty provisions concerning the jurisdictional immunities 
to be accorded certain categories of persons. 
 When analyzed closely, in particular in the context of 
surrounding provisions, 12  what is meant by “jurisdiction” in the 
                                                                                                                       
property, to undertake surveillance, to stop and search, to take physical measures to 
prevent or repress the commission of a crime, to investigate and to collect evidence, to 
issue subpoenae ad testificandum and subpoenae duces tecum, and so on—in short, to 
exercise any or all of the usual range of police, prosecutorial, judicial, and related 
executive powers in relation to criminal justice. See id. at 5. 
 11.  See, e.g., Military Technical Agreement Between International Security 
Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of Afghanistan Annex A, ¶ 3, 
Jan. 4, 2002 [hereinafter Military Technical Agreement] (applicable in respect of all 
ISAF and supporting personnel in Afghanistan).  
 12.  In the case of Annex A, ¶ 3, of the Military Technical Agreement between 
International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) and the Interim Administration of 
Afghanistan, crucial context is afforded by the other paragraphs of Section 1 
(“Jurisdiction”) of Annex A. Paragraph 1 provides that “[t]he provisions of the 
Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations of 13 February 
1946 concerning experts on mission will apply mutatis mutandis to the ISAF and 
supporting personnel.” Id. at ¶ 1. In turn, while § 22 of the Convention on Privileges 
and Immunities indicates that ISAF and supporting personnel are to benefit while in 
Afghan territory from immunity (in reality, inviolability) from arrest and detention—a 
point reiterated in Military Technical Agreement, Annex A, ¶ 4—and immunity ratione 
materiae “from legal process of every kind,” § 23 of the Convention indicates that these 
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phrase “subject to the exclusive jurisdiction” is the exercise of 
jurisdiction to enforce and to adjudicate. In relation to jurisdiction to 
enforce, such a provision represents, first, an expression by the 
receiving state of the necessary consent to the otherwise-unlawful 
deployment in its territory by the sending state of investigative, 
coercive, and custodial powers over the sending state’s personnel and, 
secondly, an undertaking by the receiving state not to exercise over 
those personnel its own right under customary international law to 
deploy such powers in its territory. In relation to jurisdiction to 
adjudicate, which as a matter of customary international law is 
concurrent in the criminal context as between the receiving state (in 
its capacity as the territorial state) and the sending state (in its 
capacity as the state whose nationals or members of its armed forces 
the personnel in question are), the relevant provision represents an 
undertaking by the receiving state not to exercise over the personnel 
sent its customary right to entertain criminal proceedings in respect 
of conduct committed in its territory. What such a provision does not 
represent is the surrender by the receiving state of its very right to 
entertain criminal proceedings in respect of conduct committed in its 
territory. The receiving state continues to possess this right, which is 
without regard to the identity of the author of the conduct, to the 
nature of the conduct, and so on. The right is plenary and remains so 
even where the receiving state undertakes not to exercise it in given 
circumstances. 
 Similarly, when a treaty provides for “immunity from the 
criminal jurisdiction of the receiving State”13 in respect of a given 
category of persons, it is referring to no more than the exercise by the 
receiving state of its jurisdiction to adjudicate. Such a provision 
                                                                                                                       
immunities may be waived. Id. at ¶ 4; Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of 
the United Nations art. VI, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 U.N.T.S. 15. Were Afghanistan to have 
surrendered its very rights not only to enforce and to adjudicate but also to prescribe in 
respect of ISAF and associated personnel, rather than merely to have undertaken not 
to exercise over such personnel its rights respectively to enforce and to adjudicate, 
waiver would be of no consequence, since Afghanistan would possess no rights to arrest 
and detain and to prosecute such personnel or to criminalize their conduct in the first 
place. The fact that Afghanistan retains under the Military Technical Agreement its 
right to regulate by its criminal and other law the conduct of ISAF and associated 
personnel is underlined in Annex A, ¶ 2, which provides that ISAF and supporting 
personnel “will respect the laws of Afghanistan.” Military Technical Agreement, supra 
note 11, at Annex A ¶ 2.  
 13.  See, e.g., Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations art. 31(1), Apr. 18, 
1961, 500 U.N.T.S. 95. [hereinafter VCDR] (relating to a diplomatic agent accredited to 
the receiving state). Again, the fact that the immunity can be waived by the sending 
state, in accordance with article 32, indicates that it constitutes merely a bar to the 
exercise by the receiving state of its jurisdiction to adjudicate, not to the existence of 
this jurisdiction, let alone to the existence of its jurisdiction to prescribe. Id. art. 32. 
That the immunity from criminal jurisdiction provided for by, inter alia, the VCDR is 
merely procedural, not substantive, was emphasized by the International Court of 
Justice in Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v 
Belgium), ICJ Rep 2002, 3, 25, ¶ 60. 
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represents an undertaking by the receiving state not to exercise any 
right it may enjoy to entertain criminal proceedings against such a 
person, a right it does indeed enjoy in respect of conduct committed 
by that person in its territory. Again, a provision of this sort does not 
represent the surrender by the receiving state of its very right to 
entertain criminal proceedings in respect of conduct committed in its 
territory. Again, the receiving state continues to possess this right, 
which is unaffected by the identity of the author of the conduct, the 
nature of the conduct, and so on. 
 In turn, by way of Article 12(2)(a) of the Rome Statute, a 
receiving State Party to the Statute delegates to the ICC the exercise 
of its customary right to entertain criminal proceedings in respect of 
the crimes specified in Article 5 of the Statute when these crimes are 
committed in its territory. Since its treaty-based acknowledgement of 
the “exclusive jurisdiction” of the sending state or its according of 
immunity from its “criminal jurisdiction” in no way diminishes the 
plenary right it possesses under customary international law to 
entertain criminal proceedings in respect of crimes under Article 5 of 
the Statute committed in its territory, a receiving State Party is 
competent to confer on the Court a plenary “jurisdiction” over such 
crimes. In short, the scope of the Court’s jurisdiction over genocide, 
crimes against humanity, and war crimes committed in the territory 
of a State Party is unaffected by the terms of any SOFA or analogous 
agreement or any treaty provision on jurisdictional immunities by 
which the State Party may be bound. 
 But this is not the end of the story. 
 A State Party’s delegation to the ICC of the exercise of what is 
its plenary right to entertain criminal proceedings in respect of 
crimes under Article 5 of the Statute committed in its territory 
nonetheless has implications for any treaty undertaking by it to 
refrain from entertaining criminal proceedings against a given 
category of persons.14 A State Party’s surrender for prosecution by 
the Court of a person whom it has undertaken not to prosecute would 
constitute a breach by that State Party of its undertaking,15 since it 
would amount to the prosecution by that state, via the medium of the 
Court, of the person.16 
                                                                                                                       
 14.  A fortiori, it has implications for any treaty undertaking by the State Party 
to refrain from exercising custodial powers over the same persons. 
 15.  A fortiori, it would constitute a breach of any undertaking by the State 
Party to refrain from exercising custodial powers over that person. 
 16.  See, to this effect, Prosecutor v. Katanga, ICC-01/04-01/07-1497, Appeals 
Chamber Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Germain Katanga Against the Oral Decision 
of Trial Chamber II of 12 June 2009 on the Admissibility of the Case, ¶ 83 (Sept. 25, 
2009), as affirmed in Prosecutor v. Bemba, ICC-01/05-01/08-962, Appeals Chamber 
Judgment on the Appeal of Mr. Jean-Pierre Bemba Gombo Against the Decision of 
Trial Chamber III of 24 June 2010 Entitled ‘Decision on the Admissibility and Abuse of 
Process Challenges’, ¶ 74 (Oct. 19, 2010). 
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 In a partial attempt to obviate such a situation, the drafters of 
the Rome Statute included in it Article 98(2), which provides:  
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender which would require 
the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations under 
international agreements pursuant to which the consent of a sending State is 
required to surrender a person of that State to the Court, unless the Court can 
first obtain the cooperation of the sending State for the giving of consent for the 
surrender.17 
 Article 98(2) is designed to bar the Court from obliging a State 
Party to act in breach of the sort of treaty undertaking to another 
state18 not to exercise one or more of its jurisdictional rights typically 
found in SOFAs and the like, although there is no reason why it 
cannot cover other agreements falling within the terms of the 
provision. In addition, Article 98(1) provides: 
The Court may not proceed with a request for surrender or assistance which 
would require the requested State to act inconsistently with its obligations 
under international law with respect to the State or diplomatic immunity of a 
person or property of a third State, unless the Court can first obtain the 
cooperation of that third State for the waiver of the immunity.19  
 The provision makes no reference to the immunity of heads of 
state, heads of government, ministers for foreign affairs, or any 
others who may benefit under customary international law or treaty 
from immunity ratione personae. It is generally accepted, however, 
that the reference to “diplomatic” immunity is to be interpreted to 
encompass other comparable immunities recognized by customary 
international law and applicable treaty.20 It is also taken as read that 
                                                                                                                       
 17.  Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 98(2), U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.183/9, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90 (July 17, 1998), entered into force July 1, 2002, 
reprinted in 37 I.L.M. 999 [hereinafter Rome Statute]. 
 18.  Unlike Article 98(1) of the Statute, article 98(2) does not apply only in 
respect of third states—that is, in the case of Article 98(2), in relation only to 
international agreements between States Parties and states not parties to the Statute. 
Id. Rather, the Court may not proceed with a request for surrender if this would 
require a State Party to breach a SOFA or cognate international agreement even with 
a sending State Party, unless the Court can first obtain the cooperation of the sending 
State Party for the giving of consent for surrender. That said, it might be expected in 
practice that the Court would either, first, in the exercise of its powers under article 
87(1)(a), request the sending State Party to give its consent to surrender, a request 
binding on that other State Party by virtue of Article 93(1)(l); or, secondly, in 
accordance with Article 89(1), issue a binding request to the sending state to surrender 
the individual itself. Id. arts. 87, 93, 89. 
 19.  Id. art. 98(1). 
 20.  That article 98(1) was textually capable of application to heads of state was 
not questioned in Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber 
Corrigendum to the Decision pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the 
Failure by the Republic of Malawi to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by 
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the reference to “immunity” encompasses inviolability.21 In short, it is 
an overstatement to suggest that the ICC may disregard alternative 
jurisdictional arrangements agreed on by way of treaty by States 
Parties to the Rome Statute. 
 The fact remains, however, that the scope of the Court’s 
jurisdiction to entertain proceedings in respect of the commission on 
the territory of a State Party of one or more of the crimes under 
Article 5 of the Rome Statute is not circumscribed by any SOFA or 
like treaty or any treaty regulating immunity from criminal 
proceedings to which a State Party may be party. If a person covered 
by such a treaty is surrendered to the Court by another State Party 
or a third state for prosecution for a crime committed in the territory 
of a State Party treaty-bound to refrain from prosecuting that person, 
the last will stand in breach of its treaty obligation, since it will in 
effect be prosecuting the person. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
 The question of the ICC’s jurisdiction over crimes committed in 
the territory of a State Party is both more complicated than Newton 
suggests, insofar as a state’s territorial “jurisdiction” is not unitary, 
and more straightforward, insofar as the lawful scope of the 
jurisdiction delegated to the Court by way of Article 12(2)(a) of the 
Rome Statute is precisely as the Statute indicates. But insofar as 
“How the International Criminal Court Threatens Treaty Norms” 
represents a loyal call for greater concern on the part of the OTP for 
the fine balance of jurisdictional allocation to which the States 
Parties to the Statute commit themselves, the article is on the money. 
Either way, Newton’s excellent piece makes an original and bracing 
contribution to the debate. 
                                                                                                                       
the Court with Respect to the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir 
(Dec. 13, 2011), in Prosecutor v. Omar Al Bashir, ICC-02/05-01/09, Pre-Trial Chamber 
Decision Pursuant to Article 87(7) of the Rome Statute on the Refusal of the Republic 
of Chad to Comply with the Cooperation Requests Issued by the Court with Respect to 
the Arrest and Surrender of Omar Hassan Ahmad Al Bashir (Dec. 13, 2011), or in any 
of the many subsequent decisions on point in Al Bashir. 
 21.  For the use of the term “immunity” to cover both immunity stricto sensu 
and inviolability, see, e.g., Arrest Warrant of 11 April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the 
Congo v Belgium), ICJ Rep 2002, 3, 29–31, ¶ ¶ 70, 71 and 75. 
